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Response
Franklin Hugh Adler
Nazli Choucri presents an ambitious approach to understanding technology and development in the Middle East — so ambitious, in fact,
that to do justice to the scope of her concerns, a book-length manuscript would be more appropriate than a conference paper. What we
have, I believe, is a preliminary anticipation of a larger, more detailed
and nuanced project, a quick overview in the form of a PowerPoint
presentation. It is toward the larger project that my comments are
addressed in the hope that they may contribute to a theoretically deep
and historically rich effort. My critique is two-fold. First, I argue that
fundamental terms such as technology, politics, and development
require more robust theorizing to do justice to the stated problem, and
that conventional, dictionary derived definitions are insufficiently
sharp to cut deeply into the more profound relations between politics,
technology, development, and sustainability that lay at the heart of
Choucri’s concerns. Second, I argue that the Middle East as a unit of
analysis needs greater geographical, cultural, and historical articulation.
Choucri departs from a definition of technology derived from Webster’s New College Dictionary, one that sees technology as “applied science” and as the “technical means of achieving a practical purpose.”
She rightly stresses that technology involves the pursuit of individual
and social objectives yet she retreats from facing up to the teleological
dimension that is central to all meaningful discussions of the phenomenon. We need some clearer ideas regarding what we take technology
to be as well as where it ought to lead us. Choucri chooses to bracket
this concern (see footnote 4 in her text), preferring a “transparent and
behavioral approach.” I beg to differ. Here we need more theory and
history to do justice to the problem of technology and development in
the Middle East, not less.
There are three dominant views regarding the normative dimension
of technology, each with varying social consequences. The Enlightenment view sees science and technology as fundamentally good. In this
triumphalist account, the progressive incorporation of science and
technology into social practice automatically produces emancipatory
consequences. Marx, as the last great Enlightenment intellectual, subscribed to this view, holding in his Economic and Philosophical Manu118
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scripts that science has transformed life and lays the groundwork for
the eventual emancipation of humanity, even though its immediate
effect under capitalism may be to temporarily accentuate dehumanization. Reflecting this view, which Engels actually called “scientific
socialism,” Lenin saw “electrification” and even “Taylorism” as requisite means of “building socialism.” A second view, which has become
the conventional wisdom, sees science and technology as neutral
instrumentalities that can be used for good or bad purposes. Good or
bad purposes are subsequently applied from outside the domain of
science and technology. Still a third view sees science and technology
more directly implicated in politics and domination; they are neither
necessarily good nor neutral. Though there are considerable differences between them, Thomas Kuhn, Everett Mendelsohn, and Herbert
Marcuse assume what might be called a social constructivist stance, in
which science and technology are seen as social activities that reflect,
to some degree, the interests, values, and ideological conceptions of
their participants. In other words, science and technology are historical-social projects, reflecting what a society and its dominant interests
intend to do with things and people.
Had Choucri situated her concept of technology within this framework, adopting one of the three views, the relationship between technology and development in the Middle East might have had greater
focus. As she is concerned with sustainable development and adapting
technology to the particular needs of the Middle East, the social constructivist view of technology would have shed some light on why
“sustainability” was never part of the European Enlightenment project, why the transfer of this technology to the Middle East might have
generated additional problems, and why the development of an
appropriate technology for the Middle East might necessitate significant theoretical revisions and not the tinkering at the margins of what
is conventionally called technology transfer. In short, Choucri would
do well to deconstruct the illusory “givenness,” or what she calls the
“transparency,” of her atheoretical and ahistorical “behavioral” concept of technology. Perhaps the place to begin could be with the distinctive needs and exigencies of technology development in the
Middle East as opposed to those of the West.
I turn my attention now to the way politics and development are
theorized. Choucri appropriately underscores the impoverished state
of conventional concepts of development, which are mechanistic and
economistic, and fail to appreciate the fundamental problem of sus-
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tainability (of nature, cultures, and societies). Given this concern, why
did she choose to employ Harold Lasswell’s celebrated “realist” definition of politics (“who gets what, when, and how”), rather than an
Aristotelian or neo-Aristotelian definition, grounded in teleology and
oriented toward “the good life?” We already saw the relation between
technology and teleology, especially as sustainability is understood by
Choucri as an important component of realizing Middle Eastern
potentiality and constructing a “good” Middle Eastern life. Although
useful in other contexts, Lasswell’s realist concept of politics is of dubious value here, locked in, as it is, to “what is” rather than to the teleological-developmental question of “what might be.” There is a world
of difference between politics seen as “who gets what, when, and
how” and politics as the realization of the good life. Lasswell’s definition is normatively empty and will not do the work that Choucri needs
to get done, given her manifest concern for a higher end than the free
play of political interests. Such a neo-Aristotelian concept of development has already been proposed by the economist Amartya Sen and
the normative philosopher Martha Nussbaum. Their “human capabilities” approach to development would be a more appropriate political
starting point for Choucri as it links technology, sustainability, and
human potentiality.
I turn now to the Middle East as the unit of analysis. Imprecision
leaves one wondering whether this is a geographical, cultural, or religious category. At times, Israel, Turkey, and Iran are included in
Choucri’s account, yet it appears as if she is generally referring to the
Arabo-Islamic world. She speaks of a deficit in cultural capital and a
failure to invest in education, as well as political corruption and discrimination against women. Undoubtedly, her description is accurate,
as amply demonstrated in the July 2002 United Nations Development
Program report on Human Development in the Arab Region. Since Choucri is concerned with development, however, the “givenness” of the
present must be historically and culturally deconstructed. After all,
during the Middle Ages, this civilization built upon and advanced the
Greek inheritance, with entire cities, such as Alexandria, created to
promote science. This occurred at a time when the West sank into stagnation, ignorance, and poverty. How can one look at the Middle East
developmentally and disregard the fact that for a considerable period
of time this very same culture was the most scientifically literate on the
face of the earth? Are there no residual aspects of this culture that
could serve as the basis for future development, if not a renaissance?
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My point is that the present can only be grasped as it relates to the past
and future, and that a developmental view of the Middle East must
take this illustrious past as a major point of reference, especially in an
analysis that focuses on how a given culture historically relates to science and technology.
My criticism is that of a reader whose curiosity was piqued and who
wants more, precisely because of the paramount importance of this
fascinating project that, hopefully, will realize its full potential in a
more richly articulated and analytically focused exploration.
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